Georgetown University Law Center

Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW

2003

Law in the Heart of Darkness: Atrocity & Duress
Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks
Georgetown University Law Center, rosa.brooks@law.georgetown.edu

This paper can be downloaded free of charge from:
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1131
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2309069

43 Va. J. Intl. L. 861-888 (2003)
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, International Law Commons, Military, War, and Peace Commons, and
the National Security Law Commons

ESSAY
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INTRODUCTION

International human rights law is an optimistic enterprise. Although
human rights law and international humanitarian law, its close cousin,
arose in response to the worst atrocities humans are capable of
committing, belief in the project of international human rights law
represents a belief in the ability of reason to prevail over violence and
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. This essay is a revised
version of a paper originally delivered in May 2002 at the International Conference on
Philosophy and the Social Sciences in Prague. I am grateful to Steve Winter, Fuyuki Kurasawa,
Steve Schiffrin, and Ed Baker for their helpful suggestions, and I am also grateful to my
colleagues at the University of Virginia School of Law for their useful comments during a faculty
workshop. I owe thanks in particular to Anne Coughlin, Richard Bonnie, and Paul Stephan.
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terror. Human rights law is premised upon the idea that even the almost
unimaginable extremes of human emotion and behavior can be made
subject to the law's rationalizing power; that law can reach into the very
heart of darkness, and make us better than we have so far proven to be.
Of course, one might say that all law is part of a fundamentally
optimistic enterprise. While it is a truism to observe that if humans were
angels, law would be unnecessary, we could equally turn the truism
around, and note that if humans were devils, law would be pointless. In
this sense, the law-making project always presupposes the
improvability, if not the perfectibility, of humankind. Whether our view
of human nature tends towards Hobbesian grimness or Lockean
equanimity, we tend to think of law as critical to reducing brutality and
violence, or at least a distinct convenience in that regard.
Our faith in the law is rarely tested, since in America, at least, few of
us ordinary people ever find ourselves at the extremes, confronting
violence and terror. But the extremes have a way of creeping up on us,
and the unimaginable can quickly and imperceptibly begin to seem
routine. Millions of ordinary Europeans discovered this in the middle of
the last century, and thousands of ordinary Americans discovered it in
Vietnam. Some Americans are discovering it again today in the
mountains and deserts of Afghanistan and Iraq. Experientially, there is
often no sharp dividing line between "ordinary" life and "ordinary" law,
on the one hand, and the extremes, on the other. After Stalin, after Pol
Pot, after the Balkan Wars and the Rwandan genocide, as well as the
countless other smaller-scale conflicts around the globe, this truth
should be apparent to us, but most of the time we prefer to forget or
deny it.
What I want to do in this essay is look closely at one example of law
operating at the extreme edge of human behavior and emotion, and see
whether it has anything particularly satisfying to offer those people who
do find themselves caught in the dark places of the earth-or any
lessons for those of us who have not so far been tested.
The example I have in mind involves the first judgment handed down
by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(better know as "the Hague Tribunal"). 1 It is the story of an ordinary
man who found one day that the moral terrain around him had changed
beyond recognition. It is also, of course, a story about law. The case,

I. The Hague Tribunal's full title is "The International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991." The court's jurisprudence is available on the
Internet at http://www.un.org/icty/judgement.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2002).
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Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, 2 was decided in 1997, but it has received only
minimal attention in English-language journals. This is probably
because, to many observers of the Tribunal, it seemed an unimportant
and even disappointing case. It involved the wrongs of an obscure
young Croatian soldier, not those of a general or a president, and its
outcome, to many critics, was hardly a resounding or satisfying victory
over the forces of evil.
Nonetheless, it is a fascinating case. It addresses a particularly
troublesome issue in criminal law: the scope of duress as a defense. This
issue in turn leads to difficult questions about what law in general can
offer us, what it is fair and reasonable to expect of ordinary human
beings caught in terrible times, and whether we it is wise to assume a
sharp discontinuity' between the ordinary and the extreme in life or in
law. The Erdemovic case can be seen as a parable about the failure of
law to live up to its optimistic promise (to protect humans from atrocity
or provide guidance to those who wish to prevent atrocity).
Alternatively, it can be seen as a parable about law's expressive and
redemptive possibilities, even in the face of evil. It is these ambiguities
that I want to explore here.

II.

ERDEMOVIC'S STORY

Drazen Erdemovic was an ethnic Croat who lived in the Yugoslav
republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 1990, Erdemovic, aged 18, began
his mandatory military service in the Yugoslav National Army, which
was at that time still more or less multi-ethnic in composition. In 1992,
voters in Bosnia-Herzegovina opted for independence from the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (in a referendum in which most of the region's
Bosnians and Croats participated, but most of the Serbs boycotted). The
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina declared its independence from
Yugoslavia shortly thereafter, and Erdemovic, who had just finished his
service with the Yugoslav National Army, was briefly mobilized into
the new republic's army as civil war engulfed the region. In November
1992, however, Erdemovic left the Bosnian army to serve with the
Croatian Defense Council's police force. His tenure there was equally
short.
By all accounts, Drazen Erdemovic was an accidental and unwilling
soldier, not a mercenary. He came from a pacifist, cosmopolitan
background, and grew up with friends of many different ethnicities. He
2. Judgement, Prosecutor v. Erdcmovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A (I.C.T.Y., Appeals Chamber,
Oct. 7, 1997), available at http://www.un.org/icty/erdemovic/appeaVjudgemcnt!erdaj971007c.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2003).
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opposed the war, and did not wish to fight; when he left the Croatian
Defense Force, he sought work as a locksmith. He eventually married a
Serbian woman he had known since childhood, and the young couple
drifted around Serbia for a time, trying to find work and a place where a
multi-ethnic family could live unmolested. They considered leaving the
Balkans altogether, and tried to get visas to Switzerland, but papers
were difficult to obtain. Finally, with his wife pregnant and his savings
almost gone, Erdemovic turned to one of the few remaining sources of
steady employment in the region, and in 1994 he enlisted once more,
this time in the Bosnian Serb Army of Radovan Karadzic's selfproclaimed "Republica Srpska," the Serb enclave within Bosnia.
Although whispers of concentration camps, torture, and other
atrocities had already reached well beyond the region, most of these
rumored atrocities were attributed to vicious Serb paramilitaries and
police, not to regular soldiers. When he joined up with the Bosnian Serb
Army, Erdemovic asked to serve in the lOth Sabotage Detachment
because its members included Croats as well as Serbs, and because it
was not a combat unit but dealt instead with specialized munitions tasks.
For a time, all went well; Erdemovic's wife bore a son, money came in,
and Erdemovic's military duties were not too onerous. 3
On July 16, 1995, however, the lOth Sabotage Detachment was
ordered to the Branjevo collective farm in Pilica, not far from the city of
Srebrenica, for a mission that was not disclosed to the soldiers until five
buses pulled up and several hundred captive Muslim men and boys were
let off, hands tied together. The Muslims-all in civilian clothes-were
lined up with their backs to the soldiers, and Erdemovic and his
comrades were told that upon their commander's word, they were to
shoot the civilians. 4
Drazen Erdemovic was incredulous. As he later told the judges of the
Hague Tribunal's Trial Chamber, "I said immediately that I did not
want to take part in that and I said, 'Are you normal? Do you know
what you are doing?'" 5 But Erdemovic's commander told him bluntly
that he had a choice: he could participate in the executions of the
Muslim civilians, or, if he felt "sorry for them," he could "stand up, line

3. Sentencing Judgement, Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. !T-96-22-Tbis (I.C.T.Y., Trial
Chamber, Mar. 5, 1998), available at http://www.un.org/icty/erdemovic/trialc/judgement!
erd-tsj980305e.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2003).
4. See Judgement, Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-A.
5. Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Stephen, Prosecutor v. Erdcmovie, Case No. IT96-22-A (I.C.T.Y., Appeals Chamber, Oct. 7, 1997) at para. II, available at
http://www.un.org/icty/erdemovic/appcal/judgcment!crd-asojstc971 007e.htm (last visited Jan. 20,
2003).
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up with them and we will kill you too. " 6
Faced with such a choice, Drazen Erdemovic reluctantly agreed to
obey the order. He made one more effort to be merciful when he spotted
an elderly man whom he recognized among the civilians. He told his
commander that the man had helped save the lives of some Serbs on an
earlier occasion, and suggested that at least his life might be spared. But
his commander said that it was not possible to spare any of the civilians:
none of them could be left alive as witnesses.
At this, Erdemovic gave up his efforts to resist, and participated,
however unwillingly, in the slaughter. He later told journalists that he
tried to kill as few people as possible, and he made an effort not to shoot
at the youngest victims. 7 But the buses kept leaving and returning with
more victims, and by the day's end, Erdemovic estimated that his
bullets might have killed as many as seventy or eighty people. Soldiers
of the lOth Sabotage Unit killed some 1200 civilians that day, a goodly
fraction of the estimated seven thousand Srebrenica civilians
slaughtered during the course of that week by the Bosnian Serb army. 8
Four months later, the Dayton Accords brought an ambiguous end to
the war in Bosnia, and Drazen Erdemovic, now 25 years old, again
found himself demobilized. But his personal war was not quite over.
Erdemovic told his story to a journalist from the French newspaper Le
Figaro, and informed her that he wanted to go to the Hague and tell his
story there as well.
He did not have to wait long. The story in Le Figaro caused a
sensation; it was the first acknowledgement by any of the perpetrators
that Europe's worst massacre since the Holocaust had indeed occurred. 9
In the wake of the Dayton Accords, Yugoslav premier Slobodan
Milosevic was eager to throw a few bones to the international
community. Handing over a general or a president like Ratko Mladic or
Radovan Karadzic would be costly for Milosevic, but picking up a
Croat foot soldier who seemed desperate to incriminate himself in any
event was an easy way to keep everyone happy. Shortly after the Le
Figaro article was published, Erdemovic was arrested by Yugoslav

6. Sentencing Judgement, Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-Tbis.
7. See Charles Trucheart, U.N. Court Gives Bosnian Croat 10 Years for Part in Massacre;
Croat Soldier is First Sentenced by U.N. Court, Austin-American Statesman, Nov. 30, 1996, at
AI (citing a March 8, 1996, report by Renaud Girard for LE FIGARO); see also Amnesty
International, Bosnia-Herzegovina; To Bury My Brothers' Bones, AI Index: EUR 63/15/96, Oct.
7, 1996 (citing the Girard report along with an account reported by Vanesa Vasic'-Janekovic', for
NAA BORBA, published Mar. 13 1996).
8. Sentencing Judgement, Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-T.
9. See, e.g., Elizabeth Neuffer, War Crimes Probe Pains Srebrenica Genocide; Charges Stir
Range Of Emotions In Bosnian City, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 2, 1996.
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authorities, 10 and promptly transferred to the Hague. 11
At this point, the story of Drazen Erdemovic also becomes a story
about law, and law's struggle to apply reason to terror. At the Hague,
Erdemovic repeated and amplified the confession had had made to Le
Figaro. His own confession was the only incriminating evidence against
him, and prosecutors were at first somewhat reluctant to charge him; the
Hague Tribunal had been established in 1992 with much fanfare and
with pledges to bring to justice the most high-ranking perpetrators, and
a conscience-stricken 25-year-old Croatian foot soldier was no one's
idea of a good start. 12 In May 1996, however, Erdemovic was charged
with one count of crimes against humanity and one count of war
crimes. 13
In November 1996 (after delays due partly to Erdemovic's shaky
mental and emotional state), he pled guilty to the first charge. But as he
entered his plea, he reiterated to the trial court that he had participated in
the massacre only because he would have been killed if he had not.
Done so. "Your Honour, I had to do this. If I had refused, I would have
been killed together with the victims .. .I could not refuse because then
they would have killed me." 14
After his guilty plea, Erdemovic was sentenced by the trial court to
ten years in prison. On appeal, his attorney argued that his guilty plea
had been uninformed and equivocal, and that his statements should
properly have been understood as a plea of not guilty because he had
been under duress at the time he committed the acts charged. 15
This raised a novel question for the Tribunal: is duress (if proven) a
complete defense to charges of crimes against humanity or war crimes,
when the crimes at issue involve the killing of innocent people? The
trial court had assumed that duress was not a complete defense, and
could serve only as a mitigating factor in sentencing. The Appeals
Chamber, however, acknowledged that the precise scope of the defense
of duress was ambiguous. The Chamber declared it a case of first
10. Ironically, he was arrested on suspicion of committing war crimes by the same regime
complicit in ordering those crimes committed.
II. See, e.g., Serbia Delivers Witnesses to Bosnia War Crimes Tribunal, L.A. TiMES, Mar.
31, 1996, at AIO.
12. I owe these insights into the inner workings at the Prosecutors office to a series of 1998
conversations with Payam Akhavan, a former prosecutor at the Hague Tribunal.
13. Indictment, Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22 (J.C.T.Y., Office of the
Prosecutor, May 22, 1996), available at http://www.un.org/icty/indictmentlenglish/erd-ii96
0529e.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2002).
14. Sentencing Judgement, Prosecutor v. Erdcmovic, Case No. IT-96-22-T (J.C.T.Y., Trial
Chamber, Nov. 29, 1996), available at http://www.un.org/icty/erdemovic/trialc/judgcmcntlerdtsj961129e.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2002).
15. I am skimming over the case's very complex procedural history here.
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impression, and undertook to determine the appropriate international
law rule relating to the scope of the duress defense. 16
There was no issue of fact at stake. The Trial Chamber did not
question Erdemovic's version of the story. 17 The prosecution stipulated
that they accepted the truth of Erdemovic's version of events, and
agreed that he probably would have been shot by his commander had he
refused to take part in the slaughter; indeed, his commander had shot
another man in the unit for disobeying orders. 18 Thus, the only question
for the Appeals Chamber was whether duress should exonerate
Erdemovic altogether or merely reduce his sentence.
The judges of the Appeals Chamber agreed, after a survey of possible
sources of international law on the issue-e.g., treaties, customary
international law, decisions of previous tribunals of an international or
transnational character such as the Nuremberg Tribunals-that there
was no unambiguous international legal standard on the scope of the
duress defense. The majority of the Appeals Chamber (Judges
McDonald, Vohrah, and Li) then sought guidance from state practice,
and concluded that while virtually all civil law jurisdictions surveyed
permitted duress as a complete defense to all crimes, virtually all
common law jurisdictions preclude the defense of duress to charges of
murdering innocent people. 19
The majority concluded that in light of the divide between common
law and civil law jurisdictions, there was no useful "general principle of
law recognized by civilized nations" that could be extrapolated from
state practice. 20 While they acknowledged a general principle that
crimes committed under duress were less blameworthy than crimes
committed without any duress or coercion, this did not resolve the
question of whether an international criminal tribunal should properly
treat duress as a complete defense or only as a mitigating factor.

16. See Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, Prosecutor v.
Erdemovic, Case. No. IT-96-22-A (I.C.T.Y., Appeals Chamber, Oct. 7, 1997), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/erdemovic/appeal/judgement/erd-asojmcd971 007e.htm (last visited Nov.
7, 2002).
17. Sentencing Judgement, Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. lT-96-22-Tbis (I.C.T.Y., Trial
Chamber, Mar. 5, 1998), available at http://www.un.org/icty/crdemovic/trialc/judgement/
erd-tsj980305e.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2002).
18./d.
19. The U.S. was the sole exception, since a few U.S. states have adopted the Model Penal
Code approach, which essentially mirrors the civil law approach. Nonetheless, most U.S. states
adopt the traditional common law approach, and the U.S. military retains the common law
approach. The Manual for Courts-Martial states that duress "is a defense to any offense except
killing an innocent person." R.C.M. 916(h), Manual for Courts Martial, United States (2000 ed).
20. See Joint and Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, Erdemovic, Case
No. IT-96-22-A.
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Ultimately, by a vote of 3-2, the majority of the Appeals Chamber
decided to adopt the general common law rule. 21 The plurality opinion
by Justices McDonald and Vohrah declared that while duress might be a
mitigating factor that would affect sentencing, duress was not a defense
to charges of crimes against humanity. Drazen Erdemovic had properly
entered a guilty plea; if duress existed, this might give rise to a lesser
sentence, but no amount of duress could exonerate him altogether. 22
In some ways this seems like an astonishing conclusion. Drazen
Erdemovic had had no desire to kill innocent civilians, and he did so
only when threatened with his own imminent death. In the context, his
death would probably have served no purpose: the Muslim civilians
would surely have been killed with or without Erdemovic's
participation, and refusal to participate in the massacre would merely
have added Erdemovic to the list of victims. In a sense, then,
Erdemovic's acquiescence in the massacre could even be said to have
reduced the total amount of death and suffering that would take place,
since at least it ensured that his own corpse would not be added to the
pile at the end of the day. Had he persisted in his refusal to participate in
the massacre, his refusal would have injured him irreparably and
benefited no one, but his participation in the massacre benefited him-it
kept him alive-while injuring no one who would not have been injured
anyway.
Why then establish a legal standard disallowing the duress defense
for Erdemovic? By establishing this standard, the majority of the
Appeals Chamber essentially declared that Erdemovic's legal guilt was
foreordained when he was ordered to Srebrenica. Erdemovic could only
have preserved his legal innocence by sacrificing his life. At Srebrenica,
the only way to be innocent was to be dead.
Of course, the Tribunal was only following the rule on duress that
prevails in virtually all common law jurisdictions. To some degree, the
Tribunal's decision in the Erdemovic case was not any more astonishing
than the various common law decisions over the centuries that have
similarly insisted that duress is no defense to murder. 23 But here I want
to suggest that the traditional common law rule precluding duress as a
defense to homicide is itself quite astonishing. The rule is not invoked
often in "ordinary" life, since accused murderers rarely seek to claim
duress as a defense. Nevertheless, the common law rule precluding
21. Judgement, Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A.
22. Joint and Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, Erdemovic, Case No.
IT-96-22-A.
23. See, e.g., United States v. LaFleur, 971 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 507 U.S.
924 (1993).
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duress as a defense to homicide seems puzzling and anomalous in a way
that little recent scholarship has addressed. 24

Ill.

REASONABLENESS IN LAW

To see the ways in which the general common law rule is anomalous,
we have to place it against the background of legal understandings of
"reasonableness." The idea of "reasonableness" is a critical standard in
the law. 25 In particular, it is the backdrop against which virtually all
legal liability is assessed in tort and criminal law. This is so obvious to
most lawyers that it is rarely discussed explicitly, except perhaps in the
context of introductory courses for beginning law students.
The importance of the concept of reasonableness is often rendered
explicit in the statutory definitions of crimes. For instance, to be
convicted of a crime in the United States, a defendant must be proven
guilty "beyond a reasonable doubt." Criminal negligence under the U.S.
Model Penal Code involves "a gross deviation from the standard of care
that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation."26 We
find similar references to reasonableness in the laws of every state; in
New York, to cite but a typical instance, to successfully plead selfdefense to avoid criminal liability for shooting someone, a defendant
must show he "reasonably believe[d]" he was in immanent danger of
death or serious bodily harm, and that he further "reasonably
believe[ d]" that only his own use of force would deter that threat. 27
Even when the word "reasonable" is not used in the statutory definition
of crimes, judges often read in a "reasonableness" requirement.
The use of reasonability as an all-purpose legal yardstick is so
24. Even the ubiquitous Joshua Dressler has given the issue only passing attention. See
Joshua Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: JustifYing the Excuse and Searching for Its
Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331 (1989).
25. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, LAW & OBJECTIVITY (1992); JULIUS STONE, LEGAL
SYSTEM & LAWYERS' REASONINGS (1964); Neil MacCorrnick, Reasonableness & Objectivity,
74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1575 (1999), observing:
[W]hen we think of legal reasoning in the common law systems or in mixed
systems ... the category of the reasonable has great importance and many uses .... In
many branches of the law, "reasonableness" is the standard set by the operative
principles and rules of conduct and of judgment.. .. (There is] a very general tendency to
rely in the law upon the standard of reasonableness as a criteria of right decision
making, of right action, and of fair interpersonal relationships.
/d. at 1578-79. Anthropologist Max Gluckman claimed that "the reasonable man is recognized as
the central figure of all developed systems of law." MAX GLUCKMAN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
AMONG THE BAROTSE OF NORTHERN RHODESIA 83 (1967). Although, as Michael Saltman's
work demonstrates (see MICHAEL SALTMAN, THE DEMISE OF THE REASONABLE MAN (1991)),
Gluckman's observation appears to be something of an overstatement, it is not much of one.
26. Model Penal Code, § 2.02(2)( d) (American Law In st. 1985) [hereinafter MPC].
27. N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 35 et seq. (McKinney 1998).
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widespread that generations of American and British law students have
become familiar with the mythic being known as the Reasonable Man.
The law's "Reasonable Man" is a kind of paragon of normalcy: he
exercises a reasonable degree of care as he goes about his daily
activities. His emotions are reasonable and temperate, and on the rare
occasions when he ceases to be temperate, his intemperance is no more
than is reasonable under the circumstance. He is a bloodless, tidy sort on
the whole, although in extreme circumstances (when he stumbles upon
his wife and her lover in flagrante, for instance, or when he is attacked
by a burglar), he occasionally gives way to an irresistible impulse and
lashes out in anger or in fear. Still, the Reasonable Man's anger and fear
are always proportionate to the provocation, and afterwards he returns
to his normal state of carefulness and calm. His behavior never lands
him in prison or subject to a hefty judgment, because the law tends to
view him as the unsanctionable norm.
These days, of course, law students soon learn that the Reasonable
Man is not only a purely mythical beast, but sometimes a dangerous one
as well. The concept of the reasonable man has been criticized not only
as an artificial construct but as a construct that privileges certain modes
of understanding and reacting over others. In particular, feminists and
critical race theorists have drawn attention to the ways in which the
"reasonableness" demanded by the law is often merely the typical
attitudes of well-nourished white males. Even the gender neutral
"Reasonable Person" frequently turns out to hold typically male
attitudes.
Some scholars have proposed more context-dependent notions of
reasonableness, which might, on occasion, replace the reasonable
person with the reasonable woman, or the reasonable battered woman,
or the reasonable poor person, or the reasonable Asian immigrant, or the
reasonable striking worker. These proposals are premised on the idea
that there is no "one size fits all" type of reasonableness, and that broad
categories of difference between persons merits legal recognition in the
form of more nuanced and contextual conceptions of reasonableness.
Nevertheless, this critique of the idea of the reasonable shares the
assumption that when something goes wrong, legal liability can and
should derive from deviations from the reasonable, as long as we can
agree on the base characteristics of the reasonable person in a particular
setting.
We might distinguish between two somewhat different
understandings of the term "reasonable." There is a weak sense of the
word and a strong sense. First, much of the time, when we speak of the
reasonable man (or reasonable woman, or reasonable poor person, etc.),
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we are speaking in fact of the "ordinary," normal or typical man (or
woman, or poor person, etc.); that is, someone who thinks, feels and
behaves in an average sort of way. He or she may turn out not to be
particularly "reasonable" in the sense of always reaching well-reasoned
decisions, but even if his or her decisions are poorly reasoned, they are
poorly reasoned in a way that is typical of the ordinary person. This first
and weaker understanding of the "reasonable person" presumes a great
bell curve applying to all realms of human behavior, and the reasonable
person is the one we find at the bell curve's very middle. We may
choose to imagine separate bell curves for men and for women, or for
abused domestic partners, or for minorities, but on this conception of
legal reasonableness, the reasonable person is always perched at the top
of the bell curve.
This conception of the reasonable person is unquestionably rather
impoverished (and in some areas of law it is considered legally
insufficient: doing whatever everyone else does will not necessarily
prevent liability). But the weak conception of reasonableness has the
virtue of being, at least hypothetically, more determinate than the
various other ways we might understand the idea of reasonableness.
After all, if the reasonable person is simply the average person (or
perhaps the average person with certain characteristics or past
experiences), we could determine whether a given defendant should be
held liable by a more or less sophisticated study or opinion poll. Such a
study or poll could presumably tell us what other similarly situated
people do or believe they would do in the defendant's situation.
If we think this conception of reasonableness as ordinariness is too
impoverished, we can turn to a second conception of reasonableness,
one that is more substantive and robust. We could insist that a
defendant's potential liability should be measured not by what an
average or typical person with his characteristics would have done in a
similar situation, but by what an average person could or should have
done. As one scholar puts it, this stronger conception of reasonableness
means that:
The reasonable person has the virtue of prudentia and uses this in
action. [Reasonableness] is a virtue that is incompatible with
fanaticism or apathy, but holds a mean between these, as it does
between excessive caution and excessive indifference to risk.
Reasonable people take account of foreseeable risks, but with
regard to serious possibilities and probabilities, not remote or
fanciful chances. They do not jump to conclusions, but consider
the evidence and take account of different points of view. They
are aware that any practical dilemma may involve a meeting
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point of different values and interests, and they take the
competing and converging values seriously .... " 28
In this stronger conception of the reasonable, the reasonable person is
inevitably some species of utilitarian; reasonableness depends precisely
upon the capacity to balance harms. This second understanding of
"reasonableness" as a standard for imposing liability is a great deal
more demanding. It insists that to avoid liability, a person must be
reasonable not in the sense of being ordinary, but in the sense of
thinking through his actions and their consequences in a thoughtful,
reasoned way, and behaving in ways that are sensible, careful, and
prudent.
This conception of reasonableness is more nuanced and powerful,
and consequently gives rise to new problems. How much care is
enough? What reasons are good reasons? What risks are foreseeable?
Which interests and values should come first? This understanding of
reasonableness also seems to some critics to offer little when it comes to
evaluating human emotions. In evaluating whether a defendant's use of
force was legitimate in self-defense, for instance, the law may ask
whether the defendant "reasonably feared" imminent bodily harm, or
whether a woman's fear that she might be raped was a "reasonable
fear." 29 But what can it mean to ask whether someone's fear was
"reasonable" when fear itself is an inherently "unreasonable"
emotion? 30 Similarly, when we deal with issues of provocation in
criminal law, or emotional distress in tort law, we may be faced with
questions such as whether a person "reasonably" felt shame or
humiliation or disgust. Like fear, these emotions are not about reason at
all. Although we can certainly ask whether a typical person in a similar
setting would feel shame or fear, it is unclear what we gain by asking
whether the emotion itself is reasonable, or whether the person could or
should have felt otherwise.
Much of the time, these two rather different conceptions of the
reasonable person-the weak and the strong-are not clearly
distinguished by courts. Courts often speak of what a "reasonable
person" could have foreseen and of what was "reasonably foreseeable,"
as if these two statements are identical; they speak of whether a

28. See MacConnick, supra note 25, at 1579.
29. See, e.g., Rusk v. State, 406 A.2d 624 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979), rev 'd by State v. Rusk,
424 A.2d 720, 727 (Md. 1981) (reversing, the Court of Appeals for Maryland noted that "the vast
majority of jurisdictions have required that the victim's fear be reasonably grounded." (emphasis
added)).
30. See, e.g., Martha Nussbaum & Dan Kahan, Two Views of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1996).
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reasonable person would have felt outraged and of whether the outrage
was reasonable; they speak of persons "of reasonable firmness," and of
when the law can reasonably expect that a person of reasonable
firmness will experience a reasonable fear. 31
Nonetheless, all of these discussions of the concept of reasonableness
and the reasonable person share a core assumption. They all take for
granted the idea that you can be held legally responsible if your
behavior was unreasonable in some way, whatever precisely is meant by
"reasonable." Conversely, if your behavior was at all times
reasonable-if a reasonable person would have done nothing other than
what you did, or if it would have been unreasonable to expect you to
have done other than what you did-you cannot and should not be held
responsible. Certainly, when it comes to criminal law, at least, most
scholars take this as a basic premise. 32

IV.

THE ANOMALOUS ASPECTS OF THE DURESS DEFENSE

Against this backdrop, the common law rule precluding duress as a
defense to charges of homicide seems peculiar. If someone puts a gun to
your head and places another gun in your hand and says, "Shoot that
person over there or I will blow your brains out," what would a
reasonable person do? Assuming that the threat is credible and there is
no doubt that the man with the gun to your head can and will blow your
brains out if you disobey, it seems unlikely that most "ordinary" people
would choose to accept death themselves rather than cause the death of
a third party, at least if the third party is not known to them. In the
weakest sense of "reasonableness as ordinariness," the reasonable thing
to do is cooperate. In the strongest sense of the term reasonable, it
seems unlikely that a prudent, thoughtful, careful person would choose
her own death over another's death. In fact, it seems thoroughly
unreasonable to expect anyone to sacrifice her own life in such
circumstances. 33 Yet this is just what the law apparently expects in most
common law jurisdictions: a willingness to value the lives of others over
one's own life, and to sacrifice one's own life, if necessary, for the good
of another. A willingness to make such a sacrifice may be a virtue, but it
31. This imprecision has also been much criticized, on the grounds that the purpose of a
"reasonableness" standard is to provide some determinacy and objectivity in assessing legal
liability. See GREENAWALT, supra note 25, at 100-08. If the very idea of"reasonableness" is
incoherent or biased or itself "unreasonable," the concept does not do the work we need it to do.
32. There are a few exceptions (strict liability offenses, for example), but these tend to be
trivial.
33. Not impossible, of course, just not terribly likely. Instances of heroism do occur, but they
seem less common than incidences of cowardice.
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is probably not a virtue of ordinary, reasonable people. It seems more
like a virtue belonging to heroes and saints.
It is for this reason that the drafters of the American Model Penal
Code abandoned the traditional common law approach to duress, and
proposed making duress available as a defense to all crimes, including
homicide. 34 To do otherwise, they stated in the commentary, would be
both imprudent and unfair:
law is ineffective in the deepest sense, indeed ... hypocritical, if it
imposes on the actor who has the misfortune to confront a
dilemmatic choice, a standard that his judges are not prepared to
affirm that they should and could comply with if their tum to
face the problem should arise. Condemnation in such a case is
bound to be an ineffective threat; what is, however, more
significant is that it is divorced from any moral base and is
unjust. 35
Return to Drazen Erdemovic. Had he not participated in the massacre
of Muslim civilians, he would almost surely have been killed himself.
There is, of course, a possibility that his command~r would have spared
him and allowed him to sit out the massacre, but the possibility must
have seemed to Erdemovic to be vanishingly small-and even the
Hague's prosecution team agreed that Erdemovic was reasonable in his
assessment of the grave danger he faced. 36 And if Erdemovic had
nonetheless heroically declared, "Go ahead, shoot me, but I won't kill
these civilians," the civilians would almost surely have been slaughtered
even without his participation. Here too, there is a faint possibility that
Erdemovic's refusal to participate might have sparked a broader
resistance among the other soldiers, but again the possibility was
vanishingly small; Serb war crimes in Bosnia were numerous and.
systematic, and it is overwhelmingly likely that with or without
Erdemovic, and even with or without his comrades in the lOth Sabotage

34. See MPC § 2.09(1):
It is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct charged to constitute
an offense because he was coerced to do so by the use of, or threat to use, unlawful
force against his person or the person of another, which a person of reasonable
firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist.

!d.
35. MPC § 2.09, explanatory note at 374-75. Dressler proposes an approach similar to that of
the MPC. Duress, he thinks, should not be precluded as a defense to any crime; the question we
should ask in determining whether it succeeds as a defense is whether "we could fairly expect a
person of non-saintly moral strength to resist the threat." Dressler, supra note 24, at 1367.
36. Sentencing Judgement, Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-Tbis (I.C.T.Y., Trial
Chamber, Mar. 5, 1998), available at http://www.un.org/icty/erdemovic/trialc/judgementl
erd-tsj980305e.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2002).
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Detachment, the Muslims of Srebrenica would have been slaughtered
sometime that week.
So: Erdemovic was effectively faced with a choice. 37 He could
participate in the massacre, and the civilians would die, but he would
live, or he could refuse to participate and he would die right along with
the civilian victims. Is it reasonable to expect Erdemovic to have chosen
other than as he did?
Under the weak conception of reasonableness-reasonableness as
ordinariness-Erdemovic was certainly reasonable. Recall his
anguished question to his commander and comrades when faced with an
order he knew to ,be unconscionable: As Erdemovic recounted to the
judges at the Hague, "I said, 'Are you normal? Do you know what you
are doing?"' 38 Sadly, Erdemovic's colleagues were "normal" indeed:
they were average humans who followed orders and didn't stick their
necks out to save people they did not know. It was only Erdemovic who
was atypical enough even to lodge a protest (and even protesting must
have taken some courage in a unit where others had already been shot
for disobeying orders).
Erdemovic's ultimate decision seems to hold up against the more
rigorous understanding of reasonability, as well. Erdemovic was prudent
and thoughtful; he correctly assessed the risks and benefits of each
course of action. Indeed, in a strict utilitarian sense, his participation in
the massacre may well have minimized the number of deaths, by
ensuring that ·at least he would not join the victims. On any
reasonableness standard, Erdemovic appears to have made a defensible
choice. Asking him to make any other choice is akin to demanding that
he make a martyr of himself, for no practical purpose. Who among us
could meet that standard? And if we acknowledge that few of us would
have ourselves had the courage to accept death rather than participate in
an atrocity of such magnitude, how can holding Erdemovic liable be
anything but the sort of hypocrisy decried by the drafters of the
American Model Penal Code, the sort of hypocrisy that renders law
meaningless, ineffective and unjust?
No less a person than Judge Antonio Cassese (no slouch on human
37. As Dressler observes, older analyses of duress tended to claim that duress was a defense
because the existence of coercion made the act an involuntary act, or the coercion overbore the
will. See, e.g., Dressler, supra note 24. Most recent commentators have insisted that duress docs
not negate the voluntariness of the act in a strict sense: the duress actor consciously engages in the
act. See generally id. Such commentators observe that the actor under duress does not lack a
choice in the matter of his action; rather, he is faced with a difficult or unfair choice. !d.
38. See Sentencing Judgement, Prosecutor v. Erdcmovic, Case. No. IT-96-22-Tbis (I.C.T.Y.,
Trial Chamber, Mar. 5, 1998), available at http://www.un.org/icty/crdemovic/trialc/
judgemcntlerd-tsj980305e.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2002).
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rights and humanitarian law) takes this view. Writing for the 2-judge
dissent in Erdemovic, Cassese first disputes the majority's assertion that
there exists no clear general principle of law on the scope of the duress
defense. He argues that a "correct" understanding of the case law would
suggest that duress should be a defense even to charges of murder. 39
Moreover, even if there was no clear principle, given the differing
common law and civil law standards, Cassese insists that the Tribunal
ought to have had recourse to the principle most favorable to the
defendant. 40
More importantly, by declaring that duress cannot be a defense to
charges of crimes against humanity or war crimes, Cassese suggests, in
effect, that the majority has abandoned the most basic legal principles. 41
Had Erdemovic "compl[ied] with his legal duty not to shoot innocent
persons," writes Cassese, "he would [have] forfeit[ed] his life for no
benefit to anyone and to no effect whatsoever apart from setting a heroic
example for mankind (which the law cannot demand him to set): his
sacrifice of his own life would be to no avail." 42 Cassese believes that
this sets the standard unacceptably high: "Law is based on what society
can reasonably expect of its members. It should not set intractable
standards of behaviour which require mankind to perform acts of
martyrdom, and brand as criminal any behavior falling below those
standards."43
Given these compelling arguments, how did the plurality on the
Appeals Chamber justify adopting an apparently anomalous common
law rule of such obvious harshness?
The Appeals Chamber was ready enough to acknowledge the
harshness of its rule, but viewed this harshness as no more than was
necessary, citing Stephen: "Surely it is at the moment when the
temptation to crime is strongest that the law should speak most clearly
and emphatically to the contrary."44
I want to quote at length here from the plurality opinion:
[T]he law should not be the product or slave of logic or
intellectual hair-splitting, but must serve broader normative
39. Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese, Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT96-22-A (I.C.T.Y., Appeals Chamber, Oct. 7, 1997), available at http://www.un.org/icty/
erdemovic/appeal/judgement/erd-adojcas971 007e.htrn (last visited Jan. 18, 2003).
40. Separate and dissenting opinion of Judge Cassese, Erdernovic, Case No. 1T-96-22-A, at
paras. 11-49.
41.ld.
42. /d. at para. 44.
43. /d. at para. 47.
44. Joint and Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, Erdernovic, Case No.
IT-96-22-A, at para. 74.
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purposes in light of its social, political and economic role. It is
noteworthy that the authorities we have just cited [e.g., Stephen]
issued their cautionary words in respect of domestic society and
in respect of a range of ordinary crimes including kidnapping,
assault, robbery and murder.
Whilst reserving our comments on the appropriate rule for
domestic national contexts, we cannot but stress that we are not,
in the International Tribunal, concerned with ordinary domestic
crimes. The purview of the International Tribunal relates to war
crimes and crimes against humanity committed in armed
conflicts of extreme violence with egregious dimensions .... We
are concerned that, in relation to the most heinous crimes known
to humankind, the principles of law to which we give credence
have the appropriate normative effect upon soldiers bearing
weapons of destruction and upon the commanders who control
them in armed conflict situations.
The facts of this particular case, for example, involved the coldblooded slaughter of 1200 men and boys by soldiers using
automatic weapons. We must bear in mind that we are operating
in the realm of international humanitarian law which has, as one
of its prime objectives, the protection of the weak and vulnerable
in such a situation where their lives and security are
endangered ....
If national law denies recognition of duress as a defense in
respect of the killing of innocent persons, international criminal
law can do no less than match that policy since it deals with
murders often of far greater magnitude. If national law denies
duress as a defense even in a case in which a single innocent life
is extinguished due to action under duress, international law, in
our view, cannot admit duress in cases which involve the
slaughter of innocent human beings on a large scale. It must be
our concern to facilitate the development and effectiveness of
international humanitarian law and to promote its aims and
application by recognising the normative effect which criminal
law should have upon those subject to them. 45
Indeed, Security Council Resolution 827, adopted in 1993,
establishes the International Tribunal expressly as a measure to
"halt and effectively redress"46 the widespread and flagrant

45. !d. at para. 75.

46. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th ·sess., 3217th mtg., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May
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violations of international humanitarian law occurring in the
territory of the former Yugoslavia and to contribute thereby to
the restoration and maintenance of peace. 47
The plurality went on to cite a number of policy reasons for their
decision, 48 insisting that "It would be naive to believe that international
law operates and develops wholly divorced from considerations of
social and economic policy.... 'There is no avoiding the essential
relationship between law and politics'. "49
Cassese, in his dissent, calls this impermissible judicial law-making:
In my view international law [on this issue] is not ambiguous or
uncertain ... [and] to uphold in this area of criminal law the
concept of recourse to a policy-directed choice is tantamount to
running foul of the customary principle nul/urn crimen sine lege.
An international court must apply lex lata, that is to say, the
existing rules of international law as they are created through the
sources of the international legal system. If it has instead
recourse to policy considerations ... it acts ultra vires. 50
In the end, the plurality does not rest its decision upon any pragmatic
or utilitarian calculus at all, but falls back on pure "moral principles."
Ultimately, they find themselves relying on the arguments of canonical
English legal scholars, and quoting from Hale's Pleas of the Crown: "If
a man be desperately assaulted, and in peril of death, and cannot
otherwise escape, unless to satisfy his assailant's fury he will kill an
innocent person then present, the fear and actual force will not acquit
him of the crime and punishment of murder, if he commit the fact for he

25, 1993), at 29, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159 (1993).
47. Cf Regina v. Howe, 2 W.L.R. 568, 582 (1987) (opinion of Lord Hailsham). Responding to
the argument that earlier prohibitions on the use of duress as a defense to homicide were
antiquated and unfair in their insistence that it is better to die than take an innocent life, Hailsham
wrote: "[It) ill becomes those of us who have participated in the cruel events of the 20th century
to condemn as out of date those who wrote in defence of innocent lives in the 18th century." !d.
48. Joint and Separate Opinions of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah Opinion, Erdemovic,
Case No. IT-96-22-A, at para. 73. They reasoned, for instance, that permitting duress as a defense
to homicide might permit leaders of gangs or terrorist organizations to effectively "immunize"
their members from prosecution by threatening them with death if they failed to obey the leader's
orders. ld (internal citations omitted). Similarly, they asserted that precluding duress as a defense
to murder might make individuals more willing to refuse to kill, knowing they might be punished
later. ld.(intcmal citations omitted). This seems a weak argument, however, for few people would
likely see possible future prosecution as more worrisome than imminent death.
49. !d. at para. 178 (quoting ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND HOW WE USE IT 5 (1994)).
50. Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese, Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, at
para. 49.
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ought rather to die himself, than kill an innocent." 51 And again from
Blackstone: A ma:n under duress "ought rather to die himself, than
escape by the murder of an innocent." 52
The plurality opinion acknowledges that an
argument often advanced by [those] in favour of allowing duress
as a defence to murder rests upon the assertion that the law
cannot demand more of a person than what is reasonable, that
is ... "that which can be expected of the ordinary, average person
in the particular circumstances ... [The argument goes that] only
they who possess the quality of heroism will intentionally offer
their lives for another. Should the criminal law then state that
compulsion could never be a defence to a charge of murder, it
would demand that a person who killed another under duress,
whatever the circumstances, would have to comply with a higher
standard than that demanded of the average person .... ' 53
Nevertheless, they note sternly that they reject "utilitarian logic ....
The approach we take does not involve a balancing of harms for and
against killing." 54 Even if those slaughtered at Srebrenica would have
died anyway, with or without Erdemovic's participation in the
massacre, he still should not have taken part, even if it meant his own
death. Better by far, said the appeals Chamber majority, to be suffer and
die but be innocent than to taint one's life by committing crimes against
humanity. To Cassese's claim that this violates "basic principles of
law," (i.e. law based on what society can reasonably expect of its
members), the plurality opinion replies, essentially, "What of it?" The
plurality's position is unyielding: "[O]ur rejection of duress as a defence
to the killing of innocent human beings does not depend upon what the
reasonable person is expected to do. We would assert an absolute moral
postulate which is clear and unmistakable for the implementation of
international humanitarian law."55
Implicitly, we have here a statement about the acceptable moral
contours of a human life, a statement about what it is that makes us
human beings, without which we might as well be dead.

51. Joint and Separate Opinions of Judge MacDonald and Judge Vohrah, Prosecutor v.
Erdcmovic, Case No. IT -96-22-A, at para. 71 (quoting LORD HALE, I PLEAS OF THE CROWN 51
(I 800)).
52. /d. (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 28 (1857)).
53. /d.
54. /d. at para. 83.
55. /d. at para. 82 (quoting Lynch v. DPP for Northern Ireland, AC 683, 711 (1975) (opinions
of Lords Wilberforce and Davies)). Italics added.
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ASSESSING THE DECISION

How should we feel about this instance when the law seems to ask
something unreasonable of us-this moment when the law seems to
require heroism and martyrdom?
On the one hand, surely Antonio Cassese and the drafters of the
American Model Penal Code are right to object. Few of us have ever
been put to the test, and if we were, few of us would likely have done
any better than Drazen Erdemovic. Can it be either just, fair, or
reasonable, then, to declare him a criminal and lock him up?
On the other hand, the plurality decision also has a powerful
normative pull. True, few of us have been put to the test; but if we were
to find ourselves in Erdemovic's situation, would we not each hope we
would have the courage to choose death over participation in the
slaughter of innocents? And if our courage failed us, would we not each
feel that we had committed a crime?
Although I have been sympathetic in this essay to the views of
Cassese and the Model Penal Code drafters, and although I consider the
view that duress does not justify homicide to be an interesting anomaly
in the criminal law, I tend to think that if I had been in the Appeals
Chamber at the Hague, I would ultimately have joined the plurality
decision, not Cassese's dissent. As the plurality says, when push comes
to shove there seems to be an "absolute moral postulate" that says that
killing innocent people in order to save ones own life is always wrong. 56
But can this view be defended without recourse to foundationalist or
natural law theories? Is there any way to appeal to an even more robust
understanding of the reasonable, one that can make the majority
decision seem fair, and make the traditional common law rule on duress
seem something other than a natural law island in a utilitarian sea?
I am not sure, frankly. We might have recourse to a Rawlsian
conception of public reason, 57 as glossed by Alessandro Ferrara, who
suggests that the product of public reason is "the most reasonable," the
"exemplary," the "reflective endorsement of our self-conception, an
idea of who we could be at our best."58 Perhaps a process of public
reason would indeed lead us to conclude that it is always better to be
killed than to kill, and that if we fail to make that choice on the spot, we
would agree that we should be punished, even though our options were
all bad ones.
56. /d. at para. 83.
57. See John Rawls, The Idea ofPublic Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV 765 (1997).
58. Alessandro Ferrara, Public Reason and the Normativity of the Reasonable, Comments
Delivered at the International Conference on Philosophy and the Social Sciences, Prague, May
II, 2002.
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Similarly, we might look to Habermasian discourse theory for help. If
legal norms are those "to which all possibly affected persons could
agree as participants in rational discourses," 59 could we defend the
common law rules on duress? It is not obvious that we could if we
abandon the "exemplary" in favor of agreement based on mere "rational
discourse." While many participants in such rational discourse might
agree that it is more noble to choose death over participation in atrocity,
some would surely resist the notion that the failure to be noble should
result in punishment as a criminal.
Where we come out on this has a great deal to do with our
conceptions of the appropriate temporal framework for understanding
the events at issue. On the spot, it seems unfair to punish someone as a
criminal just because he could not quite bring himself to die for the sake
of a principle. But if we go back far enough-before the choices
became so stark and unforgiving, before the threat of violence became
so palpable and imminent-perhaps it is fair after all. Here, taking a
different temporal view, the focus shifts to how the actor ended up in
such a bad situation in the first place. 60
Put another way: when we evaluate Drazen Erdemovic's behavior on
the farm outside Srebrenica, a lot depends on whether we see his story
as a narrative about inevitability and determinism, or as a narrative
about choice. To Antonio Cassese, Erdemovic's story is a story about
inevitability, and the very worst sort of moral luck. Erdemovic was
caught up in events beyond his control, and he had no more freedom
than a pawn on chessboard: he was an ordinary man who one day
simply found himself in an untenable situation. He was as much a
victim as the murdered Srebrenica civilians. Someone was guilty of a
terrible crime at Srebrenica, no question-but it was not Drazen
Erdemovic, young and frightened and anxious about the fate of his wife
and child. We may assume that to Cassese, the true criminals were the
likes of Mladic, Karadzic, and Milosevic, the architects of Bosnia's
ethnic cleansing.
To the majority, however, Erdemovic's story is (implicitly) a
narrative about choice. The majority treats Erdemovic as a moral agent
whose failure was only consummated at Srebrenica, but begun much
earlier. Erdemovic's crime, on this view, goes back some years; his
crime was his repeated failure to take a real stand, to insist on loyalty to
any one group or idea.
This is ironic, in a conflict replete with crimes committed in the name
59. JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS I 07 ( 1996).

60. Cf MPC § 209(2). The defense of duress is unavailable if "the actor recklessly placed
himself in a situation in which it is probable that he would be subjected to duress." !d.
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of nationalism, ethnicity, religion and other particularist loyalties.
Erdemovic, unlike many of his comrades in arms, is no particularist
fanatic. If anything, he is just a little bit too cosmopolitan: he drifts from
army to army, committed to nothing but unable to bring himself to resist
wholly. He does not just find himself unaccountably in the heart of
darkness one day-he has been complicit, little by little, in allowing
Bosnia to become one of the earth's dark places. By the time he finally
tries tci take a stand (and as I have said, even questioning his order
outside Srebrenica undeniably took courage, in an unit in which men
had already been shot for disobeying orders), it was too late. 61
Erdemovic's cosmopolitan horror at slaughtering civilians just because
of their different ethnicity gets him nowhere. He then shifts tack and
tries a particularist appeal, when he suggests to his commander that they
at least spare a man who has helped other Serbs. But this too fails, as his
commander says there can "no witnesses" to the slaughter. 62
Erdemovic was then out of options, leaving nothing but violence and
terror. Hobbes tells us that the laws of nature require men to do anything
to preserve their own lives. 63 For Erdemovic, the Hague Tribunal is far
away, and so he gives in to his own survival instincts and to the
sovereign's command-which is to say that he obeys the man with the
gun who controls the other men with guns.
But despite his commander's insistence that there be no witnesses,
Erdemovic, by turning his back on the cosmopolitan ideals of Rawls and
Habermas and obeying instead Hobbes' darker conception of law,
survives to be a witness himself. And certainly this is one way to
understand this case: as a story about the redemptive possibilities of
witnessing. If Erdemovic had not valued his own life a little bit more
than a hero ought to value his own life, there might have been no one
who was later willing and able to tell the tale of how the Bosnian Serb
Army systematically slaughtered thousands of Srebrenica civilians.
Erdemovic's fellow soldiers were able, but unwilling to implicate
themselves; the victims would have been willing, but, being dead, they
were not able.
Erdemovic's moral ambivalence proved crucial here: he was
conscience-stricken enough to recognize the massacre as a terrible
crime, and if he was not quite conscience-stricken enough to prefer
61. Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese, Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No.
IT-96-22-A (I.C.T.Y., Appeals Chamber, Oct. 7, 1997), available at http://www.un.org/icty/
erdemovic/appeal/judgement/crd-adojcas971 007e.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2003).
62. Judgement, Prosecutor v. Erdcmovic, Case No. 1T-96-22·A (I.C.T.Y., Appeals Chamber,
Oct. 7, 1997), available at http://www.un.org/icty/crdcmovic/appea1/judgcment/erdaj971007c.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2002).
63. And it is thus folly to make laws against their doing so.
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death to the moral taint of participation, he was sufficiently consciencestricken to confess to the first journalist he could find when the war
ended, sufficiently conscience-stricken to confess once more at the
Hague and plead guilty, and sufficiently conscience-stricken to provide
critical information to Tribunal investigators that could help them
prepare indictments against numerous more important suspects, such as
General Ratko Mladic and Republica Srpska President Radovan
Karadzic. As the prosecution team at the Hague Tribunal
acknowledged, without Drazen Erdemovic's eyewitness account of the
massacre (later corroborated by forensic experts who examined the site)
and his detailed description of the command structure of the Bosnian
Serb Army, the Tribunal's efforts to build cases against the numerous
much bigger fish would have been far more difficult. Perhaps, then, the
very moral weakness that enabled Erdemovic's survival also enabled
him to do something morally good: bear witness to the crimes in which
he had taken part, and honor the victims by acknowledging the horror of
their deaths.
If the story of Prosecutor v. Erdemovic is a story about one man's
moral failure, partially redeemed by the process of bearing witness, it
can also be read as a parable about of the international community, its
half-hearted institutional efforts to address and prevent atrocities, and
the limits and possibilities of law.
The Hague Tribunal was the ultimate cosmopolitan institution, with
all that is glorious and all that is troubling about cosmopolitan
institutions. Its establishment by the United Nations Security Council in
1993 represented the first major international judicial effort to punish
and deter atrocities since the Nuremburg and Tokyo Tribunals nearly
fifty years earlier. Its formation was linked in the minds of many of its
creators with the long-term goal of creating a permanent international
criminal court, one that could truly act as the conscience of humankind
and ensure the end of impunity for human rights abusers. But the
Tribunal also suffered from its very cosmopolitanism: a creature of the
UN bureaucracy, it was accountable to no one in particular, unrooted in
any legal or political culture, unable to connect in any meaningful way
to the people whose lives it claimed to effect. Since it depended upon
the military muscle and intelligence reports of its Security Council
sponsors, the Tribunal was, by itself, nearly toothless: it couldn't get the
NATO powers to arrest any of its most wanted but still politically useful
criminals.
Of course, though its coercive powers were minimal, the Tribunal
could, and did, lock up former Private Erdemovic. Was its decision to
declare Erdemovic a criminal in part an act of expiation for law's
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failings-for the failure of human rights and humanitarian law to live up
to its promises, and the failure of the international community to care
enough to stop the slaughter in the former Yugoslavia?
Certainly there was plenty of moral failure to go around during the
Bosnian war, and the massacre of seven thousand Srebrenica civilians in
July 1995 represents one of the international community's most glaring
and shameful failures during the conflict. But there is almost no mention
in any of the Appeals Chamber opinions in Prosecutor v. Erdemovic of
the institutional and political context in which the Srebrenica massacre
occurred. In a case that could be read as a parable about moral
cowardice and the (possibly) redemptive aspects of bearing witness, the
Tribunal's silence about this is loud indeed.
Recall that in 1995, unable to summon the political will to take sides
in the Bosnian conflict or impose a peace, but dogged by media reports
of atrocities against civilians, the UN Security Council came up with the
idea of declaring certain areas within Bosnia UN "safe areas," to which
civilians could go and be protected by UN peacekeeping troops.
Srebrenica was one such "safe area," and in the summer of 1995
thousands of Bosnian Muslim civilians poured into Srebrenica to seek
protection from the incursions of the Bosnian Serb army and
paramilitaries. As the plurality opinion in the Erdemovic case dryly
notes, however, the Dutch UN troops protecting the "safe area" of
Srebrenica (the judges had enough sense of shame to keep the term in
quotation marks) surrendered their weapons to the Serbs and withdrew
rather than risk a fight. It was their abandoned civilian charges who
were brought by the busload for Erdemovic and his fellow soldiers to
slaughter.
Naturally, none of the Dutch UN peacekeepers were ever brought up
on criminal charges for their failure to protect the civilians they were
pledged to protect, and no high-ranking UN officials were charged as
accomplices in the murder of the thousands who died, and none of the
Security Council powers who gave the UN leaders their marching
orders will ever truly be called to account. 64 Peacekeeping soldiers and
their political leaders are protected by a web of ad hoc and treaty-based
immunities from prosecution, and for the most part this is probably as it
should be. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that had these immunities
been absent, and had ordinary common law principles of criminal
liability applied, some or all of these actors might well be considered
criminally liable for the deaths of the thousands of massacred
64. The Dutch cabinet faced a belated political reckoning in the wake of a recent report about
Srebrenica, which led ultimately to a rash of resignations. See Srebrenica Muslims to request UN,
Dutch responsibility before ICJ, AGENCE FRANCE PRESS, Apr. 21, 2002.
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Srebrenica civilians. 65 Certainly, the Srebrenica massacre could not
have occurred without countless political and moral failures of the first
order made by people and institutions with far more power and
information than Private Drazen Erdemovic.
By declaring that under international law, duress is not a defense to
charges of killing innocent people, and by sentencing Drazen
Erdemovic to prison, perhaps the Hague Tribunal was acknowledging
these collective failures in the only way available-even at the risk of
appearing breathtakingly hypocritical. After the failure of the
international community to prevent the Srebrenica massacre, and the
embarrassing failure of the Tribunal to get its hands on any highranking suspects, how could the Tribunal permit the very first defendant
brought before it-a man who admitted killing 70 to 100 innocent
people-to walk free? Punishing Erdemovic was the Tribunal's sole
mechanism for honoring the pain of the victims at Srebrenica. Thus, the
eloquent plurality opinion insisting on "absolute moral postulates" and
declaring that not even the desire to avoid one's own death could justify
atrocities. This allowed the majority on the Appeals Chamber to use law
itself as a mechanism for bearing witness to the inexcusable moral
failures of our collective institutions.

VI.

BACK TO ERDEMOVIC

All very well, but despite the numerous and collective moral failures,
only Drazen Erdemovic went to prison. Someone had to be punished,
and he was available, the sacrificial lamb. So, back to Erdemovic: what
did he make of the whole business?
The Tribunal's insistence that duress is no defense to the killing of
innocent people may seem to create an international legal standard more
suitable for heroes and saints than for ordinary mortals. But Erdemovic
himself seemed to have agreed with the majority's view of the issue.
During his sentencing hearing in November 1996, he wept as he
explained to the judges why he had decided to plead guilty, despite his
conviction that he had acted under duress. At Srebrenica, he said,
[My commander] said, "If you do not want to [participate in the
executions], stand with them ... so that we can kill you too ... " I
65. Although ordinarily omissions do not give rise to criminal liability, the peacekeepers
stood in a special relationship to the civilians, arguably had something analogous to a contractual
duty to protect them, and certainly promised to protect them, effectively dissuading the civilians
from seeking to escape the region as they might have done had no claims about "safe areas" been
made.
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was not afraid for myself at that point, not that much ... but what
would happen to my child and to my wife? So there was this
enormous burden falling on my shoulders .. .I knew that I would
be killing people, that I could not hide this, that this would be
burning at my conscience. . . 66
[My attorney] told me, "Drazen, can you change your mind, your
decision [to plead guilty]? .. .! do not know what will happen .... "
[But] I told him because of those victims, because of my
consciousness, because of my life, because of my child ·and my
wife, I cannot change what I said ... because of the peace of my
mind, my soul, my honesty, because of the victims and war and
because of everything.
Although I knew that my family, my parents, my brother, my
sister would have problems because of that, I did not want to
change it. Because of everything that happened I feel terribly
sorry, but I could not do anything .... Thank you. I have nothing
else to say. 67
In July 1995 Erdemovic could not bring himself to say to his
commander, "Go ahead, shoot me, because if I participate in this
massacre something in me will die anyway." But afterwards, ~e all but
turned himself over to the authorities, and pled guilty. Had he not come
forward voluntarily and confessed, he would likely never have been
found or prosecuted, and had he not pled guilty he would almost
certainly never have been convicted; the only evidence against him was
his own words, and the prosecutors at the Hague had better things to do
than go after young privates. Perhaps for Erdemovic, pleading
guilty-and accepting his sentence-was part of restoring his sense of
himself as a moral person. Perhaps, from his own point of view,
suffering his sentence (he ultimately served five years) was necessary to
redemption.
VII. WHAT CAN WE CONCLUDE?

The story of Drazen Erdemovic's life and trial is full of painful
ambiguities. This may lead some to dismiss its significance, either on
the "hard facts make bad law" theory, or on the theory that the situation
66. Sentencing Judgement, Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-Tbis (I.C.T.Y., Trial
Chamber, Mar. 5, 1998), available at http://www.un.org/icty/erdemovic/trialc/judgementl
erd-tsj980305e.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2002).
67. Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Stephen, Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT96-22-A (I.C.T.Y., Appeals Chamber, Oct. 7, 1997) at para. II, available at http://www.un.org
/icty/erdemovic/appeal/judgement/erd-asojste971 007e.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2003).
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Erdemovic faced was so extreme that it offers no lessons for the rest of
us ordinary people: we, after all, are not soldiers, and not in a war, so
what can Erdemovic's story possibly have to teach us?
But it is the very ambiguities in this story that should give us pause.
First, the story of Erdemovic should raise serious questions about how
far apart "ordinary life" really is from the heart of darkness. For Drazen
Erdemovic and his fellow soldiers at Srebrenica, the darkness crept up
slowly and imperceptibly. One day Bosnian Muslims were neighbors
and friends, and only a short time later, the "normal" men of the 101h
Sabotage Detachment were willing to slaughter their former neighbors
without hesitation. Only for Erdemovic was the darkness visible, and
even he was unable to resist its pull.
Erdemovic's story seems extreme, but the last century suggests that
there is not a sharp disjuncture between the ordinary and the extreme.
We often prefer to imagine wars and genocides and atrocities as events
that "just happen" every now and then, much like tornadoes or
lightening strikes; this metaphor suggests that we can't generalize from
them, since they are radically discontinuous with ordinary life. This is
dangerously misleading, however. Genocides and atrocities do not "just
happen": some people work very hard over a long time to make them
happen, and others permit them to happen by averting their eyes or
failing to cry out against the encroachment of darkness.
Today we Americans are in a "war against terrorism." Without
wishing to be too apocalyptic, I would suggest that this is a time for us
to be particularly alert to the risks of sliding towards the extremes.
Government encroachments on civil liberties; a rise in hate crimes
against Muslims and Arabs; a growing popular sentiment that
"anything" is justified in the name of national security-all of these are
danger signs. The press has reported on allegations that American
soldiers in Afghanistan beat and abused prisoners (including some
prisoners who turned out to be US allies, captured in error). 68 Similarly,
there have been recent reports that U.S. government personnel have
tortured Al Qaeda suspects at secret interrogation centers in Afghanistan
and elsewhere. 69 Without additional evidence, there is no reason to
assume that these allegations are true. But after a century that has seen
so many atrocities committed by so many ordinary people, there is also
no reason to assume that the allegations are false.
68. See, e.g., Eric Slater, Response To Terror; U.S. Forces Beat Afghans After Deadly Assault,
Ex-Prisoners Say; War: Reports Add To Evidence Suggesting That The Attack Targeted Innocent
People. L.A. TIMES, Feb. II, 2002, at A I.
69. See, e.g., Don van Natta, Threats And Responses: Interrogations; Questioning Terror
Suspects In a Dark and Surreal World. New York Times, March 9, 2003, at AI.
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Keeping all this in mind, what I earlier described as an anomaly in
domestic criminal law may make more sense. In common law
jurisdictions, duress is a generally a complete defense to all
crimes-except for murder. This is puzzling if we think that "ordinary
life" always remains ordinary, for if it does, why not just be consistent,
and allow the duress defense across the board? If we realize that the
ordinary can become extreme in the blink of an eye, however, the
refusal to permit duress as a defense to the murder of innocents seems
less an anomaly than a stern warning of how easily events may slide out
of control. Perhaps the rule is meant to say to us, "If you find yourself
having to choose between killing an innocent person and preserving
your own life, you have already chosen wrong." Perhaps the rule is
meant to draw our attention to the slipperiness of the descent into
darkness.
Even so, if this is all that the law can do for us, the optimistic dream
of using reason and law to reach into the dark places of the earth is still
far, far from being realized. Not all our law or all our philosophy were
of much use to Drazen Erdemovic as he faced his commander on the
farm outside Srebrenica. Reason and law still seem to lack sufficient
normative force in the face of violence and terror: they provide us with
what appears to be prospective guidance on how we should behave in
some hypothetical future, and retrospective guidance on how we ought
to have behaved in the past, but little guidance when we're actually on
the spot.
"Inter arma silent legis," Cicero said famously: in time of war, the law
is silent. The project of advancing human rights and humanitarian law is
dedicated to eliminating that silence, but it has not yet succeeded in
doing so, and perhaps it never will succeed; Erdemovic, alone at the eye
of the storm, heard not even a still small voice. There was no law for
Erdemovic, or for those he so unwillingly killed: only power, and fear.
Law came later.

